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1 Introduction 
1.1 Clarifying the Topic 
In this thesis I will be discussing the Norwegian framework for the use of countervailing 
measures (CVM). The framework in question is the legal one, so that other types of policy, 
trade policy included, are outside the scope of the topic. The Norwegian legislation is the 
basis for the discussion, but as Norway has signed and ratified several multilateral (and 
bilateral) agreements regarding international trade, a discussion of the Norwegian legisla-
tion also involves a discussion of the relevant international agreements and their implemen-
tation into Norwegian law. The most important ones are the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994 (the GATT 1994) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (the SCM Agreement), which Norway have become signatories to through the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). Norway is also a signatory to the European Economic 
Area (EEA) Agreement, but unlike the European Union, the EEA is not a customs union 
and we therefore have no common rules regarding CVM in relation to countries outside the 
EEA. I will, however, be using the EU law on CVMs as a basis for comparison to the Nor-
wegian framework. Norway is a small economy that, to a great extent, relies on exporting 
its goods and services, especially in industries like the solar industry, where other countries 
have better conditions to utilise solar panels. I will be comparing Norway´s framework for 
the use of CVMs with the EU´s framework, to see how two different WTO Member´s have 
implemented the WTO agreements and what rights they have granted their industries. I will 
also be discussing possible reasons for the EU using CVMs more frequently than Norway. 
 
1.2 Materials and Methodology 
1.2.1 Relevant Materials 
There are two WTO agreements regarding subsidies and CVM relevant to this thesis: the 
GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement. They have been implemented into Norwegian legis-
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lation through the Customs Act of 2007. The old Customs Act of 1966 and an administra-
tive regulation1 connected to it are also relevant when interpreting the current legislation. 
There is no Norwegian jurisprudence connected to the current or the historical legislation in 
this field, but there are preparatory works both from the current and the expired legislation. 
As for the EU legislation, there is a regulation2 and practice regarding CVM.  
 
1.2.2 Methodology 
The starting point for discussing the Norwegian framework for the use of CVM is the Cus-
toms Act of 2007. When interpreting its provisions I will start with the ordinary meaning of 
the wording, and consider preparatory works, expired legislation and administrative regula-
tions. Many different elements will influence a factor´s persuasiveness, and I will discuss 
this on a case-by-case basis.   
 
The Norwegian framework for the use of CVM is largely influenced by international 
agreements, and consequently these must also be interpreted to determine the content of the 
Norwegian law.  
 
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) 
Article 3.2 stipulates that the WTO dispute settlement system shall interpret the WTO pro-
visions “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”. 
In US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body noted: “The ‘general rule of interpretation’ [set out 
in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] has attained the status of 
a rule of customary or general international law.”3 Consequently, the Vienna Convention 
(VCLT) must be used when interpreting the GATT 1994 and the WTO covered agree-
ments. 
                                                
 
1 The Introductory Provisions to the Customs Tariff. 
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 597/2009. 
3 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, page 17. 
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The general rule of interpretation in Article 31.1 of the VCLT is that a term in a treaty shall 
be interpreted in its “ordinary meaning” taken in its context and in light of its “object and 
purpose”. In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body stated that Article 32 of 
the VCLT also has attained the status of a rule of customary law, so that the supplementary 
means of interpretation mentioned here also might be relevant when interpreting the cov-
ered agreements of the WTO.4  
 
Panel and Appellate Body Reports are only binding on the parties in the specific case, and 
there is no rule of stare decisis in WTO dispute settlement, which means that later panels 
and the Appellate Body are not obliged to follow their previous interpretations.5 However, 
they often follow their earlier interpretations of a provision if they consider it persuasive, 
and this is in accordance with the DSU Article 3.2, which provides that the dispute settle-
ment system shall provide “security and predictability to the multilateral trading system”. 
Given that the reasoning in a report is well founded it is likely that later panels and the Ap-
pellate Body will follow it. For this reason I will be referring to WTO jurisprudence when 
interpreting terms in the GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement. I will mainly be using Ap-
pellate Body reports, as this is the final authority of appeal in the WTO dispute settlement 
system.6  
 
                                                
 
4 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, page 10. 
5 It is clear that there is no de jure doctrine of stare decisis in international trade law, but as 
Raj Bhala (Bhala (1999) p. 151) claims in his trilogy on the matter, it seems to be a de facto 
doctrine of stare decisis in WTO adjudication.  
6 The DSB ultimately decide a dispute as they must adopt Appellate Body reports. A report 
is considered adopted and accepted ”unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the 
Appellate Body report within 30 days following its circulation to the Members”, cf. DSU 
Article 17.14. 
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1.3 Defining the Issues – the REC Case  
REC – Renewable Energy Corporation ASA – is a Norwegian solar energy company 
founded in 1996. REC has production facilities in Singapore and the US, and sales offices 
in several countries across the world.7 During the last few years, the solar market has 
grown rapidly and overproduction has caused a steep price decline. Production costs in 
Norway were too high to compete with solar products from e.g. China. In April 2012 REC 
announced that they would be closing down the remaining production facilities in Norway.8 
Before they shut down their production in Norway, both the company itself and the Nor-
wegian government had to consider their options. For the owners of REC it was a question 
of profit. They were losing money producing in Norway. On the other hand, moving the 
production abroad could mean losing government support they might have been receiving 
from the Norwegian government, and a loss of important contracts and customers. The ma-
chinery and facilities were hardly used and it would be costly to shut down. What rights 
would REC have if they had wanted to prevent subsidized solar panels being sold below 
market price in Norway? Did Norwegian law give them the right to protect themselves 
against unfair competition from abroad? Could REC have joined e.g. EU or US efforts to 
prevent subsidised products from China taking over market shares?    
 
For the Norwegian government there were other interests to consider, for instance the in-
terest in developing a new technology and industry. Today oil is a large income for Nor-
way, but it will not last forever, and there is a clear wish and need to focus on advanced 
technology for the future. The solar industry is still in its infant years and it continues to 
grow. It is an industry that many countries wish to develop, and if the Norwegian govern-
ment provided research and support for REC in its early days, would they not want to keep 
them here? Further there were more than 1,000 people who lost their jobs when REC left 
Norway, and any technology REC had taken out a patent on was taken abroad. Could the 
                                                
 
7 Key Facts, by REC Group. 
8 Press release: ”REC to exit all wafer operations in Norway”. 
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government have prevented the alleged unfair competition from China from forcing REC 
out of Norway by using CVMs?  
 
Furthermore, the government had to consider the fact that they are representatives for third 
party interests that they have committed themselves to through, e.g. international agree-
ments. A third party interest that is particularly prominent when considering the use of 
CVM is the environmental interest. Norway has signed several international treaties regard-
ing the environment. Through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) Norway has agreed to, inter alia, the transfer of technology to develop-
ing countries to help them develop in a sustainable way, to use less coal and avoid them 
making the same mistakes as industrialised countries made while they were developing. 
What does this technology transfer involve for Norway, and could it mean that Norway 
should let, e.g. China, be in charge of developing the solar industry? Does it mean that 
Norway, after spending time and resources developing an industry, must give this technol-
ogy to developing countries? It should also be asked if a country´s climate policy itself 
could justify the use of CVM. 
 
One way to protect REC from artificial competition from abroad could have been to im-
pose CVMs upon subsidised imports that were causing injury to the Norwegian solar panel 
industry. The national process for the imposition of CVM is a WTO regulated process, and 
the WTO regulation has been implemented into the WTO Members´ national legislation. In 
part 2, I will therefore be analysing the use of CVM as set forth in the GATT 1994 and the 
SCM Agreement before I in part 3 proceed to discuss the interests of the industry and the 
government when determining whether or not they wish to use CVM to protect the solar 
industry. CVM have not been used by Norway for many years, and in part 4 I will be ana-
lysing the implementation of the WTO legislation into Norwegian law, and discuss if the 
chosen technique may have affected the use of the trade measure. I will also be comparing 
the Norwegian framework to the EU´s framework for the use of CVM. I have chosen the 
EU as a basis for comparison because they have chosen a somewhat different technique 
than Norway when implementing the WTO legislation and they occasionally use CVM. I 
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will be discussing possible reasons as to why the EU use CVMs more frequently than Nor-
way and if this may be a result of the different national/union legislation.  
 7 
2 The International Framework for the Use of Countervailing 
Measures 
2.1 Introduction 
As an understanding of the WTO rules regarding CVM is necessary for the understanding 
of the Norwegian framework, I will begin discussing the WTO law on subsidies and CVM. 
After defining CVMs and when they can be used, I will continue to analyse the rights given 
to the domestic industries through the WTO law on CVM. 
 
In essence, CVMs are a reaction by one WTO Member to another Member´s use of action-
able or prohibited subsidies. They are an exception to the GATT 1994 Article II:1(b), 
which states that when products described in a Member´s Schedule of Concessions (Part I) 
is imported into the territory to which the Schedule relates, they shall “be exempt from or-
dinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein.” A countervailing 
duty will be in excess of that provided in a Member´s Schedule, but paragraph 2(b) of Arti-
cle II legalises the use of countervailing duties, as long as they are applied consistently with 
the provisions of Article VI.  
 
Article VI:6(a) of the GATT 1994 lists three conditions which must be fulfilled before a 
Member lawfully can impose CVM upon another Member. There must be evidence of a (1) 
subsidy, (2) injury to the domestic industry and (3) a causal link between the two. Before I 
go on to discuss the different types of CVM available and when they may be imposed, I 
will discuss what constitutes a subsidy, as this is a condition that must be fulfilled regard-
less of the type of CVM being imposed. The investigation prior to the imposition of CVM 
is often referred to as an anti-subsidy investigation.   
   
2.2 What Constitutes a Subsidy? 
The GATT 1994 does not itself define what constitutes a subsidy, but the SCM Agreement 
contains a detailed definition. According to Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, there are 
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three elements, which must all be satisfied, for there to be a subsidy: (1) there must be a 
“financial contribution”, (2) by a “government or any public body within the territory of a 
Member”, (3) and the contribution must confer a “benefit”. 
 
2.2.1 Financial Contribution 
The Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV, stated: “An evaluation of the existence 
of a financial contribution involves consideration of the nature of the transaction through 
which something of economic value is transferred by a government. A wide range of trans-
actions falls within the meaning of "financial contribution" in Article 1.1(a)(1)”.9 This indi-
cates that not all government measures are regarded as a “financial contribution”, only the 
ones that fall within Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)-(iv). This was also stated by the Appellate Body in 
US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), which said that the subparagraphs of Article 
1.1(a)(1) provide an exhaustive, closed list of types of “financial contribution”, “so that a 
transaction that does not fall within one of the listed categories is not covered by the 
Agreement.”10 
 
2.2.2 By the Government or a Public Body 
The second element in the subsidy definition is that the government or a “public body” has 
made the financial contribution. What constitutes a “government” will usually not be in 
dispute, but the interpretation of a “public body” has been a matter of contention in the 
WTO dispute settlement system on several occasions. The Appellate Body in US – Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) discussed what constitutes a public body 
within the SCM Agreement and in its Report it was said that “a public body within the 
meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement must be an entity that possesses, exer-
cises or is vested with governmental authority. Yet, just as no two governments are exactly 
                                                
 
9 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, paragraph 52.  
10 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), paragraph 101. 
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alike, the precise contours and characteristics of a public body are bound to differ from 
entity to entity, State to State, and case to case.”11 This means that it will have to be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis what constitutes a “public body”, but that there are certain 
characteristics that should be present, such as the possession of governmental authority. 
According to Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv), a private body making a financial contribution may be 
identified with the government when the government has entrusted or directed the private 
body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) to 
(iii).  
 
2.2.3 That Confers a Benefit 
The last element that must be present for there to exist a subsidy is that the financial contri-
bution must confer a “benefit”. What constitutes a “benefit” has been discussed in WTO 
jurisprudence. In Canada – Aircraft the Appellate Body said: “A ‘benefit’ does not exist in 
the abstract, but must be received and enjoyed by a beneficiary or a recipient.” It then went 
on to say that “there can be no ‘benefit’ to the recipient unless the ‘financial contribution’ 




A government measure that fulfils the three elements is considered a subsidy. However, not 
all subsidies are within the scope of the SCM Agreement´s disciplines, and therefore not all 
subsidies can be counteracted with CVMs. Subsidies must be “specific” according to Arti-
cle 2, cf. Article 1.2, to be subject to the disciplines set out in the SCM Agreement. They 
                                                
 
11 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), 
paragraph 317. 
12 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Aircraft, paragraphs 154 and 157. 
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can be specific to an industry, an enterprise, a group of enterprises or a group of industries 
in the Member State, cf. Article 2.  
 
Of the specific subsidies there are two types that may be subject to CVM: actionable subsi-
dies and prohibited subsidies. Actionable subsidies are those, which cause adverse effects 
to the interests of another Member. According to Article 5.1 of the SCM Agreement there 
are three types of adverse effects, but only “injury to the domestic industry of another 
Member”, Article 5.1(a), can be the basis for the initiation of an anti-subsidy investigation, 
cf. Article 11.2. Prohibited subsidies may also be the foundation for the imposition of 
CVM. According to Article 3.1, there are two types of prohibited subsidies; export subsi-
dies and import substitution subsidies. They are prohibited because their purpose is to af-
fect trade, and thereby, in all probability, will cause adverse effects (injury) to other Mem-
bers´ industry. If a dispute regarding the existence of a prohibited subsidy is brought for 
settlement in the DSB, CVM can be imposed if, after a final determination of its existence, 
the prohibited subsidy is not brought to an end.13    
 
For an actionable subsidy to be the basis for imposing CVM, it must be evidenced that a 
subsidy exists (Article 1), that it is specific (Article 2), that there is injury caused to the 
domestic industry of the investigating Member (Article 5.1(a), and that there is a causal 
link between the subsidy and the injury. This last element means that injury caused by oth-
er factors, cannot be attributed to the effects caused by the subsidy.  
 
2.2.5 Summary 
A CVM can be a reaction to both prohibited and actionable subsidies, and they can be im-
posed both unilaterally and multilaterally. As a unilateral remedy, CVMs are imposed by a 
Member itself, after an anti-subsidy investigation, and do not have to go through the WTO 
dispute settlement system. As a multilateral remedy, a WTO Panel/Appellate Body can 
                                                
 
13 Example: US - FSC 
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impose them if prohibited subsidies are not discontinued after a final decision. In both cas-
es the CVM aims at offsetting the injurious effects of a subsidy. I will be limiting this the-
sis to the use of CVMs as a unilateral, national remedy. Next I will discuss what constitutes 
a CVM and the procedure for the investigation leading to its imposition. In part 4 I will be 
discussing the implementation of these provisions into Norwegian and EU law.   
 
2.3 Defining Countervailing Measures 
Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement states that “no specific action against a subsidy of an-
other Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as 
interpreted by this Agreement.” As CVMs are “an action against a subsidy”, the first place 
to look for a definition of the term is the GATT 1994. Article VI:3 contains a short defini-
tion: “the term ‘countervailing duty’ shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for 
the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly, or indirectly, upon the 
manufacture, production or export of any merchandise”. The same definition is found in 
footnote 36 to Article 10 of the SCM Agreement.  
 
To determine what the definition means it must be interpreted. The starting point for the 
interpretation is, according to the VCLT Article 31.1, the term´s “ordinary meaning”, seen 
in its context and in light of the treaty´s object and purpose. The definition says that CVMs 
are a “special duty”, which must mean that they are something other than an ordinary cus-
toms duty. Further, the purpose of the duty is to offset a “bounty or subsidy”, which indi-
cates that it is a duty to counteract the effects of a subsidy. One of the GATT 1994´s pur-
poses, as indicated in its preamble, is to ensure “the full use of the resources of the world 
and expanding the production and exchange of goods”. If a subsidy, as defined in the SCM 
Agreement, causes injury to the domestic industry of a Member (Article VI:6(a) of the 
GATT 1994), this is working against the purpose of the Agreement, as such subsidies are 
preventing those who actually produce competitive products at competitive prices, from 
competing in the global market. Therefore, a countervailing duty must be understood as an 
extraordinary duty to prevent unfair or artificial competition and thereby an unsustainable 
development.   
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A CVM is not any type of measure that has the potential to offset the injurious effects of a 
subsidy. The different types of CVMs that can be used are fairly limited. Article 10 of the 
SCM Agreement says that Members shall take “all necessary steps” to ensure that the im-
position of CVMs “is in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994 and the terms of 
this Agreement”. The term “all necessary steps” indicates that there is no leeway for Mem-
bers on this matter. If it said “all possible steps” it would perhaps mean that the Members 
had a certain margin of appreciation to do everything possible, but that if they did not suc-
ceed, that could also be satisfactory. The term “all necessary steps” to ensure that the impo-
sition of CVM “is in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994 and the terms of this 
Agreement” has been interpreted by the Appellate Body to mean that a Member cannot 
impose other CVM than those listed in Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 and Part V of the 
SCM Agreement. In US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) the Appellate Body said that “To 
be in accordance with the GATT 1994, as interpreted by the SCM Agreement, a response to 
subsidization must either be in the form of definitive countervailing duties, provisional 
measures or price undertakings, or in the form of multilaterally sanctioned countermeasures 
resulting from resort to the dispute settlement system.”14 Imposing CVMs must be done in 
accordance with both the GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement.15 Before I discuss the dif-
ferent types of CVM I will present the main rules governing the imposition of them.  
 
2.4 Imposing Countervailing Measures According to WTO Rules  
In the following section I will be analysing the procedure for imposing CVM pursuant to 
the national system16 in addition to a brief discussion of the requirements that must be ful-
filled before CVM can be imposed. This is to see what rights and obligations are granted to 
                                                
 
14 Appellate Body Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), paragraph 273. 
15 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, page 14. 
16 As opposed to the imposition through the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. 
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the state and to the industry according to the WTO system, so that when I discuss the Nor-
wegian legislation, I can see if they have been transferred to the domestic law of Norway.   
  
The procedure for applying CVM is regulated in Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Articles 
10 to 23 of the SCM Agreement. According to GATT 1994 Article VI:6(a) three conditions 
must be fulfilled in order for a Member to impose CVM. There must be evidence of (1) a 
subsidy, (2) injury to the domestic industry and (3) a causal link between the two. Article 
15.5 of the SCM Agreement provides that “It must be demonstrated that the subsidized 
imports are, through the effects of subsidies, causing injury within the meaning of this 
Agreement.” (My underlining.) This means that injury caused by other factors is not to be 
attributed to the (injury caused by) subsidised imports, as they have no causal link with the 
subsidy. These conditions must be proven through an anti-subsidy investigation.  
 
As a rule, a Member must receive an application from the domestic industry before they 
can initiate an anti-subsidy investigation,17 cf. Article 11.1 of the SCM Agreement. It is 
important to determine what constitutes the “domestic industry”, and Article 11.4 stipu-
lates, inter alia, that:  
 
“The application shall be considered to have been made "by or on behalf of the 
domestic industry" if it is supported by those domestic producers whose collective 
output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total production of the like product 
produced by that portion of the domestic industry expressing either support for or 
opposition to the application. However, no investigation shall be initiated when 
domestic producers expressly supporting the application account for less than 25 
per cent of total production of the like product produced by the domestic industry.” 
 
                                                
 
17 The exception in Article 11.6 will be discussed under section 4.3. 
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This means that if, for instance REC, had wanted to submit an application, they would need 
support from other producers in the industry in Norway unless they themselves accounted 
for at least 25 per cent of the solar panel industry in Norway, and more than 50 per cent of 
the industry that either expressed support for or opposition to the application.     
 
Article 11.2 of the SCM Agreement says that the application must provide “sufficient evi-
dence” of  “(a) a subsidy and, if possible, its amount, (b) injury within the meaning of Arti-
cle VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement, and (c) a causal link between the 
subsidized imports and the alleged injury.” This indicates that the industry must undertake 
some investigations of their own before they can make a complaint to the government. 
Nevertheless, the authorities cannot take the information provided in the complaint for 
granted, and must, according to Article 11.3, review the evidence provided in the complaint 
before initiating an investigation. The investigation itself must determine with certainty that 
the three elements contained in the application are present before (definitive) CVM may be 
imposed. Detailed rules regarding evidence, calculation of the amount of a subsidy and 
how to determine injury to the domestic industry are found in Articles 12 to 16 of the SCM 
Agreement. I will not be discussing the details of these provisions, as it would be too broad 
for the scope of this thesis.  
 
If REC had applied for anti-subsidy investigations to be initiated by the Norwegian authori-
ties, it would be important for them to know the timeframe for the investigation. If they 
were losing profits due to artificial competition from China, they would have to calculate if 
they could afford to keep producing in Norway for the duration of an investigation. If an 
investigation would not be within their financial means, there would be no reason to submit 
an application. Article 11.11 of the SCM Agreement stipulates that investigations should be 
concluded within one year of their initiation, and in no case later than 18 months. The one-
year limit may only be exceeded in “special circumstances”, and according to the Panel in 
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Mexico – Olive Oil, there is no basis in Article 11.11 to prolong an investigation beyond 18 
months, whatever the reason may be.18  
   
Before the initiation of an investigation, the investigating authority shall invite the Mem-
ber, which may be subject to investigation, to consultations with the ambition of clarifying 
the situation as to the matters referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11, cf. Article 13.1. This 
could add to the time before an investigation is initiated, unless the consultations are suc-
cessful and thereby conclude the matter. However, the provision only says that the Member 
that may be subject to an investigation “shall be invited for consultations”. As the Panel in 
Mexico - Olive Oil stated, “we see no requirement that a sufficient interval must be allowed 
after issuance of the invitation and before initiation that consultations could be held. Ra-
ther, the requirement in that provision is that the invitation must be issued ‘in any event 
before’ initiation, with no indication of any specific time interval.”19 Given that the authori-
ties promptly send out an invitation for consultations, the initiation of an investigation 
should not be delayed. Article 13.2 states that consultations should, preferably, continue 
during the investigation, with a view to reach a mutually agreed solution. 
 
An anti-subsidy investigation can end in three different ways; if the authorities are satisfied 
that there is not sufficient evidence of subsidisation or injury the investigation must be ter-
minated promptly (Article 11.9); if the exporter revises its prices or eliminates or limits its 
subsidies, also known as voluntary undertakings (Article 18.1(a) and (b)); or if the investi-
gating authorities impose definitive countervailing duties (Article 19.1). Even if the domes-
tic industry finds that the conditions for imposing CVM are satisfied, and the investigating 
authorities too, there is no guarantee that the decision-making authorities will use CVM. 
 
                                                
 
18 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, paragraph 7.121. 
19 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, paragraph 7.39. 
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2.5 The Different Types of Countervailing Measures 
There are two (three) different types of CVM that can be imposed as a result of an anti-
subsidy investigation. They can be imposed at different times during the investigation and 
may be imposed for a shorter or longer period of time. They are called definitive counter-
vailing measures and provisional measures. It can be argued that a third type, voluntary 
undertakings, is not really a CVM as it is not the investigating authorities that impose a 
duty upon the exporting Member, but rather the exporting Member voluntarily eliminating 
the injurious effects of its subsidisation. For that reason I consider it not to constitute a 
CVM, and will not be discussing it in further detail.  
 
2.5.1 Definitive Countervailing Measures 
The imposition of definitive countervailing measures is regulated in Article 19 of the SCM 
Agreement. According to paragraph 1, a Member can only impose definitive countervailing 
measures after making “a final determination of the existence and amount of the subsidy 
and that, through the effects of the subsidy, the subsidized imports are causing injury…” 
Ergo, the investigation must have been successful and come to an end. As a consequence of 
the principle that injury caused by other factors than the subsidy shall not be attributed to 
the subsidy, the ‘lesser-duty’ rule in paragraph 2 states: “…the duty should be less than the 
total amount of subsidy if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the 
domestic industry…”.   
 
2.5.2 Provisional Measures 
The application of provisional measures is regulated in Article 17 of the SCM Agreement. 
Provisional measures are temporary. Pursuant to Article 17.1(c), the application of provi-
sional measures must be judged “necessary to prevent injury being caused during the inves-
tigation”, and thereby have the characteristics of a security measure for the investigating 
authorities´ domestic industry. According to paragraph 3, provisional measures may not be 
applied earlier than 60 days from the date of initiation of an anti-subsidy investigation and 
they shall be “limited to as short a period as possible, not exceeding four months”, cf. para-
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graph 4. The Panel in US – Softwood Lumber III said that the limitations in paragraphs 3 
and 4 are unambiguous, and cannot be deviated from.20 This seems reasonable considering 
the imposition of provisional measures do not require the same level of certainty with re-
gard to the evidence as definitive measures do.  
                                                
 
20 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber III, paragraph 7.100. 
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3 Countervailing Measures in the Solar Industry – Interests of 
the Main Actors 
3.1 Introduction 
The solar industry is still in its infant stage, and as climate change and energy supply are 
political concerns across the globe, many countries and companies see the opportunities 
and benefits in developing this industry. The technology is continuously developing, in-
creasing the quality and decreasing the production costs. A state´s interests in developing 
the solar industry are not necessarily concurrent with the interests of the industry itself. The 
primary concern for the industry will often be how to improve their technology and in-
crease its market share, whilst the state´s interests will often include a broader concern for 
the society as a whole. The state is also a representative for third party interests through, 
e.g. international agreements and national policies. In paragraph 3.2 I will be discussing the 
interests of the solar industry and in paragraph 3.3 the interests of the government, both as 
the executive branch of government and as a representative of third party interests, when 
considering the use of CVM in the solar industry.  
 
3.2 The Solar Industry 
The solar industry has the opportunity to influence Norway´s use of CVMs, as they can 
make a complaint to the government regarding a foreign country´s subsidisation causing 
injury to their industry (SCM Agreement Article 11.1). Their interests in imposing CVM 
may differ from those of the government and also the environmental interests the govern-
ment represents. They have a different agenda than the government and not the same obli-
gations regarding the environment. Additionally, the interests within a company itself may 
differ. For instance, in the REC case, the board possibly had different interests than the 
owners as they also represented the employees. In the following, I will look at some of the 
factors that may affect the solar industry´s interests related to the use of CVM, on the basis 
of the REC case.    
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3.2.1 The Interests of the Owners  
A domestic industry can send an application to the government requesting that they initiate 
anti-subsidy investigations against WTO Members who subsidise their industry (only if it 
is prohibited or actionable subsidies) and thereby cause injury to the domestic industry. The 
purpose of an investigation is to determine whether or not to use CVM to prevent the inju-
ry. A question that should be asked, is why REC did not submit such an application to the 
Norwegian authorities? In the following I will discuss the interests of REC´s owners, and 
then the interests of the board of directors.  
 
To be able to produce electricity from solar panels, there is a basic requirement for suffi-
cient sunshine. Consequently, Norway does not have a high demand for solar panels. Ger-
many, Italy, USA, Japan and China are the most developed markets within the solar indus-
try today,21 hence REC is dependent on export to these – and other – countries to make a 
profit. The Norwegian market was not where REC made their money. When they started 
losing money producing in Norway, imposing CVM on solar panels being imported into 
Norway would not be sufficient to save the Norwegian production facilities. What REC 
needed, was a competitive advantage in the bigger solar panel markets.  
 
Even though REC´s position would not have improved drastically if CVM were imposed 
upon solar products being imported to Norway, the signal effect it could have on other 
countries with a solar panel market could have an impact on REC. Firstly, it could cause 
the Member with the subsidised exports to remove or limit the injurious effects of the sub-
sidy, not only in relation to exports to Norway, but also on exports to other countries, to 
avoid them imposing CVM. This would not only benefit the industries in the importing 
countries. It would also be beneficial to the exporting country, as they, or their subsidised 
industry, would get the profit from, for example, raising the price on exported products. If 
CVM were imposed, the countries imposing them would be the ones benefitting from the 
                                                
 
21 Market Overview by REC Group. 
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extra duty levied upon the subsidised imports. Consequently, the effect of one country im-
posing CVM could be that the exporting country limits or removes the effect of the subsidy 
to all importing countries. However, there is no guarantee for this, and it would be a chance 
for REC to take. The effect could also take years, which REC might not have been able to 
afford to wait for.    
 
REC´s purpose is described in their Articles of Association §3 where it says, inter alia, 
“The Company’s purpose is development and sale of products and services related to re-
newable energy sources, and to perform other financial operations related to such.” If this 
purpose could not be pursued in Norway, or it could be pursued more efficiently elsewhere, 
it is likely that the owners of REC would see fit to relocate its production to a location 
where the purpose was more likely to be fulfilled. The Articles of Association does not 
specify that the purpose must be fulfilled in Norway, and given that CVM imposed by the 
Norwegian government would have minimal effects on REC´s sales, this could be one rea-
son why they did not submit an application with the Ministry of Finance to initiate anti-
subsidy investigations. 
 
Both the US and the EU have initiated anti-subsidy investigations against China, and the 
US investigation has already been concluded and resulted in the imposition of definitive 
countervailing duties up to 15.97 % on solar PV products imported from China.22 Before 
the definitive decision was made, the Chinese government referred two disputes to the DSB 
regarding the preliminary duties imposed. On 25 May 2012 and 17 September 2012, China 
requested consultations with the US through the WTO dispute settlement system regarding, 
inter alia, the preliminary determinations regarding CVM imposed on their solar exports.23 
                                                
 
22 Fact sheet by the U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, 
2012. 
23 US – Countervailing Measures (China) and United States – Countervailing and Anti-
dumping Measures on Certain Products from China. 
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China is moving from a developing to a developed country, which involves a need for more 
electricity, preferably of the renewable kind. As they are not responding well to countries 
that try to limit their exports, it seems as though REC has decided to stay out of the on-
going trade war so as not to agitate the Chinese government. In a press release from 20 July 
2012, REC denies any unlawful act after being made respondent to the investigation initiat-
ed by the Chinese towards the US solar industry. In the press release REC stated: 
 
“REC has opposed the imposed import duties in the US, and has voiced its opposi-
tion to a threatened trade case against Chinese made solar modules imported into 
Europe. 
  
REC is disappointed at the escalation of the trade war with the recent filing and is 
regretful of the prospect of increased costs across solar industry. REC Silicon val-
ues its Chinese customers highly, and does not believe it has engaged in price dis-
crimination or unfair or illegal international trade in the export of its US made pol-
ysilicon to China and will defend itself in relation to any such charges.”24    
 
It could be that REC sees an opportunity of expanding their market share in the Chinese 
market, and therefore do not wish to agitate them by joining the ongoing trade war between 
China, the US and the EU. In May last year, REC announced that they would be opening a 
new applications and research centre in China. In connection with this, Kurt Levens, VP of 
Commercial Development and Planning in REC Silicone said that they wish to be close to 
their expanding customer base in China.25 If REC were to participate in the solar trade war 
with China, it would in all likelihood not impress their potential (and existing) Chinese 
                                                
 
24 Press release: ”REC Regrets the Escalation In Solar Industry Trade War And Denies Any 
Wrongdoing”.  
25 Press release: ”REC Announces New Silicone Technologies Applications and Research 
Center in Shangyu, China”. 
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customers. Their interest is to develop their technology and produce products at competi-
tive prices, whether in Norway or in other countries. 
 
3.2.2 The Interests of the Board of Directors 
The board of directors represent the interests of the owners, and also the interests of the 
employees. These will often be similar, but the shutting down of REC´s production facili-
ties in Norway gives an example of when the interests of the owners and those of the board 
of directors may not correspond.  
 
The board of directors in REC had four employee representatives when it was decided that 
REC would cease all wafer operations in Norway. Three of them voted against the 
closedown decision.26 There is no documentation of the reasoning behind the voting, but it 
could be the result of their interests being focused on the employees, and not on the own-
ers.  
 
3.3 The Norwegian Government´s Interest in Developing the Solar Industry 
in Norway 
A country´s interest in developing an industry will often be different from the interests held 
by the industry itself. The government holds the interests of the country as a whole, which 
do not necessarily correspond to the interests of an industry trying to make a profit.  
 
Norway has long, dark and cold winters, which is not ideal for producing solar energy, and 
this is the time of year when the demand for energy is highest. During a Norwegian sum-
mer the days are long and the conditions are good for producing solar energy, but at this 
time of year the demand for energy is down. This makes Norway less suitable for solar 
energy production than countries that have more sunshine throughout the year. However, 
                                                
 
26 Press release: ”Rec to exit all wafer operations in Norway”.  
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Norway has large deposits of quartz with a high content of silicone, which is an important 
part of wafers used in solar panels. Other than using the silicone for domestic production of 
wafers, Norway can utilise its access to the raw material in two ways; either export it for 
wafer production in other countries, or develop the necessary technology and industry itself 
and export the end product.27 On these grounds, Norway could benefit financially from the 
raw material even without developing and maintaining their own solar industry. However, 
there are interests that speak in favour of having a solar industry in Norway, and the focus 
in this section, will be arguments for and against using CVM to protect the Norwegian so-
lar industry.   
 
3.3.1 Norwegian Investment in the Solar Industry 
If a country spends resources investing in its own industries, for example for research or 
capital to start up a company, it seems natural that the government would wish to protect its 
industry from other countries subsidising and causing injury to the domestic industry, po-
tentially forcing domestic producers to close down. I will therefore be looking at invest-
ments the Norwegian government has made in the solar industry generally, and REC spe-
cifically, and thereafter discuss other interests which could affect Norway´s decision not to 
initiate anti-subsidy investigations against imports of subsidised solar PV products.  
 
From 2004-2012, most of the research and technology development in the renewable ener-
gy sector was organised through the Norwegian Research Council´s RENERGI-programme 
(Clean Energy for the Future). The different Ministries have financed the RENERGI-
programme, but the main funding has come from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. 
The programme financed about 500 research and development projects, in total approxi-
mately 2 billion NOK. Though this is used for research in many different fields within the 
clean energy sector, a not insignificant part of it has been used for research and develop-
                                                
 
27 Holen … [et al.], 2008.  
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ment on solar energy.28 From 2013, the programme is continued through the ENERGIX-
programme. One of the main goals of the ENERGIX-programme is to develop the Norwe-
gian industry in fields where the Norwegian participants have an advantage.29  As I have 
mentioned, Norway has the necessary raw material for silicone wafer production and also 
knowledge and technology within the industry. This indicates that the Norwegian partici-
pants in the solar industry have such an advantage, and as REC was one of the largest pro-
ducers in the industry, they should have been protected from being forced out of the coun-
try. It makes little sense to invest so much in developing the solar industry if we are going 
to let go of the largest producers. It is however specified that to be considered a Norwegian 
participant, a company does not have to be operating in Norway as long as it contributes to 
economic growth in Norway. Though REC is no longer producing in Norway, it is still a 
Norwegian company, with its headquarters in Sandvika, and is thereby contributing to the 
Norwegian economy.  
 
In 2009, the Norwegian Research Centre for Solar Cell Technology was opened. In their 
2011 annual report, the statement of accounts shows that more than 1/3 of their funding 
came from the Norwegian Research Council,30 which itself is funded by the Norwegian 
government. Both this and the RENERGI-programme are examples that show that the 
Norwegian government has, and still is, investing large resources in developing renewable 
energy sources in general, and solar energy specifically.   
 
According to Nordland County Administration,31 REC has since the start-up in 1996 re-
ceived close to 120 MNOK in high-risk loans and grants from them, channelled through 
                                                
 
28 RENERGI End Report (2012). 
29 The Norwegian Research Council (2005).  
30 The Norwegian Research Centre for Solar Cell Technology (2011).  
31 Skille (2012).  
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Innovation Norway.32 Both the Norwegian local and central governments have, and still 
are, investing significant amounts in the solar industry. Spending such amounts on research 
and grants, one can ask why the Norwegian government did not do more to keep REC, one 
of the world´s largest solar companies, producing in Norway?  
 
One possibility could be that the extensive support provided by the Norwegian government 
to REC, and the rest of the domestic solar industry, is itself a subsidy that can be counter-
acted by importers of Norwegian solar panels. If Norway initiates investigations towards 
other countries´ industries, it could increase the chances of an investigation against the 
Norwegian industry, revealing the double standards it would be for Norway to counteract 
subsidies to other countries´ solar industry. Considering REC was not able to produce at 
competitive prices even with the subsidies they were receiving, the Norwegian industry 
would most definitively have to close down if trade measures were imposed on their ex-
ports, or if the subsidies were stopped.    
 
3.3.2 Employment   
A factor, which is important for all economies, is the state´s unemployment rate. When 
REC closed down their production facilities in Norway, more than 1,000 people were left 
unemployed. However, according to Norway´s national budget for 2013, the unemploy-
ment rate has decreased to a historically low level. This doesn´t mean that the government 
is not concerned about unemployment, but there is a demand for labour in Norway, espe-
cially engineers. In times with a high unemployment rate the government might be more 
inclined to use CVM, but it´s more likely to be one of several factors, and not a reason on 
its own to use or not to use CVM.  
                                                
 
32 Innovation Norway is one of the Norwegian Government´s most important instruments 
for innovation and development of Norwegian industry. 
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3.3.3 A Small Economy in the Global Market 
The solar industry is still a young industry where producers are fighting for market shares 
in a constantly growing market. Norway lost its largest actor when REC closed down pro-
duction here. If Norway is not willing to protect its own industries, they have little chance 
of surviving in competition with artificially competitive foreign producers entering the 
Norwegian market. On the other hand, Norway is a small country dependent on export. 
According to WTO statistics, Norway was the world´s 31st largest exporter and 36st largest 
importer in 2011 which, considering the population is barely 0,1 % of the world´s total, is 
noteworthy.33 This shows how dependent Norwegian welfare and development is on other 
economies, and for Norway to initiate an anti-subsidy investigation against any large econ-
omy, would have minimal effects, especially in an industry like solar panels where the in-
dustry is dependent on exporting its products. The most developed solar markets in 2011 
were Germany, USA, Italy, Japan and China.34 As long as subsidised, cheaper solar prod-
ucts are freely exported to these markets, the Norwegian industry won’t be able to compete.  
 
The EU is currently investigating China´s subsidisation of their solar industry and China 
has requested consultations with the EU regarding some of their solar subsidy pro-
grammes.35 The Chinese consultations with the EU are first and foremost regarding the 
solar industries in Greece and Italy, and as I have mentioned, Italy is one of the worlds 
most developed solar markets. As Norway´s solar industry will benefit from subsidised 
exports being prevented from entering markets where they themselves export their prod-
ucts, Norway should take part in these disputes. They should be securing their interests in 
                                                
 
33 WTO´s Statistics Database, Norway. 
34 Market Overview by REC. 
35 EC News Archive: EU initiates anti-subsidy investigation on solar panel imports from 
China and WTO dispute: European Union and certain Member States — Certain Measures 
Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector. 
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the global market. Norway should not ignore trade matters that can affect the Norwegian 
industries.36   
 
3.3.4 Norway´s Oil and Gas Industry 
Norway is a small economy dependent on the global economy and export of goods, in par-
ticular oil and gas. During 2009 and 2010, the EU Member States implemented Directive 
2009/28/EC, which sets targets to increase the share of energy from renewable energy 
sources.37 According to the International Energy Agency´s (IEA) Key World Energy Statis-
tics 2012 Edition, Norway is the 9th largest oil exporter in the world and the 3rd largest nat-
ural gas exporter.38 Many of the largest importers, especially of natural gas, are EU Mem-
ber States. If they reduce their use of oil and gas, it will affect Norway´s export to these 
countries. Norway needs to protect and promote the development of e.g. solar power in 
Norway, or we will lose an important source of income. We should reflect the development 
in the countries we export to, and try to adjust to their development. This, in addition to the 
fact that the oil will not last forever, should encourage Norwegian authorities to protect 
other industries that will help secure the future of the Norwegian economy.  
 
3.3.5 Norway as a Representative for Third Party Interests 
Through, inter alia, its national policies and international commitments, Norway has agreed 
to promote interests that will not necessarily benefit Norway economically, but which for 
other reasons are important to society. A third party interest when discussing CVMs in the 
                                                
 
36 After the Nobel Peace Prize was given to Liu Xiaobo, who in China is considered a crim-
inal, the relationship between Norway and China has been tense, and the Norwegian gov-
ernment may not want to put more pressure on the Norway-China relationship by entering 
the solar trade war.     
37 Directive 2009/28/EC Article 1. 
38 Key World Energy Statistics 2012 pages 11 and 13. 
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solar industry, is the environmental interests and the possible effect they may have on a 
state´s decision to use, or not to use, CVM in this industry. In this section I will be discuss-
ing some of the environmental interests that may affect Norway´s use of CVM in the solar 
industry, with a focus on the UNFCCC Article 4.5 and the Norwegian Climate Compro-
mise. 
 
3.3.5.1 The UNFCCC Article 4.5 
In the UNFCCC preamble, the Parties to the Convention acknowledge “that change in the 
Earth´s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind…” They also 
note that the largest share of green house gas (GHG) emissions have originated in devel-
oped countries, and that developing countries´ emissions will continue to grow to meet 
their social and developmental needs. For years industrialised countries polluted without 
regard of the harm it was causing the environment. Therefore, it is said that the historical 
responsibility for reducing the GHG emissions lay with the industrialised countries. In ad-
dition to reducing their own emissions, developed countries need to help developing coun-
tries economically and technologically to reduce their emissions. This is part of the reason-
ing behind the UNFCCC´s declaration of countries´ “common but differentiated responsi-
bilities” (UNFCCC Article 3.1) to mitigate climate change. Our common responsibilities 
refer to all countries being responsible for creating a sustainable future. Even though they 
are differentiated, this does not give developing countries a right to pollute more than nec-
essary.  
 
As a result of these “common but differentiated responsibilities”, the developed country 
Parties included in Annex II (Norway has agreed to this part of the UNFCCC) have in Arti-
cle 4.5 of the UNFCCC agreed to “take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and fi-
nance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and 
knowhow to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to im-
plement the provisions of the Convention.” When REC, which was Norway´s largest pro-
ducer of solar panels, moved their production out of Norway, Norway lost much of its mar-
ket shares to other countries and REC´s technology was relocated abroad. In the following I 
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will discuss whether or not Norway´s obligation39 to transfer technology could have had an 
impact on their use of CVM in the solar industry.40  
 
According to the VCLT Article 31.1, the general rule of treaty interpretation is that “a trea-
ty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their contexts and in light of its object and purpose.” It seems 
clear that the technology and knowledge Norway has gained in the solar industry must be 
considered to fall within the term “environmentally sound technologies” in the UNFCCC 
Article 4.5, so the next question is whether or not the UNFCCC Article 4.5 expresses an 
obligation for the Norwegian Government to give, or sell, its knowledge to developing 
countries.  
 
The Oxford Dictionary defines ‘transfer’ as conveying, removing or handing over e.g. a 
thing. The term ‘access to’ is defined as “the right or opportunity to reach, use or visit.” 
These terms must be seen in the context of the treaty in light of its object and purpose. In 
determining the purpose of a treaty, Article 31.1 of the VCLT says that the treaty´s pream-
ble may be taken into consideration. The last sentence of the UNFCCC´s preamble sug-
gests that the purpose of the treaty is to “protect the climate system for present and future 
generations”. Keeping this in mind, the terms ‘transfer’ and ‘access to’, in the context of 
the UNFCCC, do not mean that Norway has to give up its solar industry for the benefit of 
developing countries to be able to respect its commitments. It could, however, mean that 
we should be sharing our technology or knowledge so that developing countries also can 
take advantage of it.  
 
                                                
 
39 The wording of Art.4.5 indicates that it is so-called soft law, and thereby less binding 
than traditional law. 
40 I will not be discussing the details of the process of technology transfer itself. 
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The obligation in Article 4.5 is not simply to transfer or give access to certain technologies, 
but to “take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate…” a 
transfer or access to. “All practicable steps” indicates that what is not possible is not ex-
pected, but at the same time reasoning non-fulfilment of the obligation with it being incon-
venient, will not be sufficient. The obligation does not state that developed countries must 
give their technologies to developing countries free of charge. For example, if China lacked 
the knowledge to develop “environmentally sound technologies”, they could financially 
cooperate with Norway to develop e.g. solar panel technology. That way Norway would be 
promoting the transfer of solar panel technology. Norway could also finance research and 
development of solar technology in China, or assist in other ways with their development.  
 
The term “as appropriate” in Article 4.5 limits the obligation. For instance it would not be 
appropriate to send Norwegian scientists to China to facilitate the transfer of solar technol-
ogy if the scientists lives were in danger in China. Neither would it be appropriate to fi-
nance research in a country where the researchers were victims of human rights breaches, 
or where corruption made it hard to determine what the money was actually used for. It 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis what is considered “appropriate”.        
 
Given that Norway promoted, facilitated or financed China´s access to solar technology, 
could Norway subsequently impose CVM upon imported products that resulted from that 
technology transfer? It´s a known fact that labour costs and the cost of production itself 
often are cheaper in developing countries than in Norway, and if the industry is also subsi-
dised by the government, prices can be even lower. If Norway imposed countervailing du-
ties in such a situation, it would contravene the purpose of the UNFCCC Article 4.5. Addi-
tionally it would not make much sense if Norway first spent resources helping to develop 
an industry abroad, and later imposed CVM on that industry´s exports. On the other hand, 
one of the WTO´s purposes is to promote free trade, which speaks in favour of imposing 
countervailing duties where the conditions are fulfilled and the government wishes to do 
so. Additionally, technology transfer is supposed to help the country secure a sustainable 
future, which does not necessarily mean they must export the products. 
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Free trade and technology transfer are two important and internationally agreed upon obli-
gations, and which one that will prevail if a dispute arises is not easy, if even possible, to 
predict. Nevertheless, it could be inconsequential for a country to first promote the transfer 
of an environmentally sound technology to a developing country, and later hinder their 
exports.    
 
3.3.5.2 Norwegian Climate Policy 
Norwegian climate policy has been a topic for discussion and disagreement for years, but in 
April 2012, the Government finally agreed on a recommendation41 regarding Norwegian 
climate policy. This White Paper elaborates the objectives and principles in Norwegian 
climate policy from the 2008 Climate Agreement.42 In June 2012 the Storting (Norwegian 
Parliament) reached the Climate Compromise.43  
 
The White Paper outlines some of the Government´s suggestions on how to reach the goals 
they have agreed to in the Kyoto Protocol, with the ultimate goal to become a low-emission 
society. It says that Norwegian “climate policy should contribute to develop and transform 
[the] industry and commerce in a climate-friendly direction. Technological development is 
a crucial element.”44 Though the solar industry can be developed without REC, they have 
agreed to promote climate friendly technology development, and REC certainly contributed 
to this.  
 
                                                
 
41 Meld.St. 21 (2011-2012). 
42 Innst. S.nr. 145 (2007–2008). 
43 Ministry of the Environment News Archive, 11 June 2012: ”Klimaforliket vedtatt i 
Stortinget”. 
44 Meld.St. 21 (2011-2012) page 4. 
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According to the White Paper part 1.7, the Government “proposes a national initiative to 
develop technologies that can mitigate climate change”. They wish to establish a climate 
and energy fund for development of technology and industrial transformation. This was 
approved by Parliament in the Climate Compromise. Through the White Paper and the 
Compromise, the Norwegian Government shows its ambition to focus on developing new 
technologies to reduce GHG emissions. They also agreed to ban fossil fuels to heat private 
houses from year 2020, and to continue the benefits given to those who own electric cars. If 
more people use electric cars, we will use more electricity. This electricity should come 
from renewable energy sources, such as solar power. It seems contradictory with the Gov-
ernment’s ambitions to let go of the technology we have already developed in the solar 
industry. We need these technologies to meet the goals set in the Climate Compromise.  
  
As we have seen, the Norwegian government cannot exclusively consider internal interests 
when determining whether or not to use CVM. Third party interests, such as the environ-
ment, must also be considered. As a developed country we have certain responsibilities to 
secure a sustainable future, which cannot necessarily be given less priority than other inter-
national obligations.  
 
3.4 Summary 
In this section I have discussed the interests of the main actors in the solar industry when 
determining whether or not to use CVM. Whilst the industry is mainly concerned with in-
come and expenses, the government has a much wider range of interests to consider, and 
must prioritise. Their priorities will not always correspond to the main interests of the in-
dustry.  
 
In section 4 I will analyse Norway´s use of CVM in light of the various interests, and dis-
cuss how they may affect the solar industry´s decision to file an anti-subsidy complaint, 
and the government´s decision to initiate investigations, finally imposing CVM. I will also 
be discussing the possibility of the government´s interests affecting the implementation of 
the WTO legislation into Norwegian law.  
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4 Norway´s Use of Countervailing Measures 
4.1 Introduction 
In this section I will be analysing the Norwegian framework for the use of CVM. Before I 
discuss the separate provisions and the rights presented therein, I will examine the history 
of the Norwegian framework and how it has affected the existing legislation. In section 4.2 
I will compare the Norwegian legislation to the relevant EU legislation, to demonstrate two 
different methods for implementing the WTO agreements into national law, and to see how 
the use of CVM may be affected by the chosen method.  
 
4.1.1 The Legal Framework in an Historical Context  
The Customs Act of 2007 is the result of a technical revision of its predecessor from 1966. 
The Customs Act of 1966 was the successor to a law from 1928, which had many and very 
detailed provisions. The 1966 Customs Act did not contain any rules regarding subsidies 
and CVM, but these were added by an administrative decision.45 The Act was revised in 
199346 to make the law more up to date and to implement international agreements Norway 
had become part of since 1966.  
 
The GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement entered into force after the revision in 1993, and 
they had to be implemented into Norwegian law to be binding internally. The implementa-
tion of international agreements in Norway occurs either by incorporation or transfor-
                                                
 
45 The Introductory Provisions to the Customs Tariff §3. §3 was continued as an 
administrative decision every year as part of the National Budget. The last time the Storting 
made this decision was in 2007, which expired 31.12.2008.  
46 The revision resulted in a revision act: Lov av 3. juni 1994 nr 14: Lov om endringer i lov 
av 10. juni 1966 nr. 5 om toll (tolloven). 
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mation.47 When an agreement is incorporated, a formal decision (an act) is made stating 
that the treaty itself is legally binding in Norway. By using the second method, transfor-
mation, the treaty is transformed into Norwegian law by enacting a new act (or new articles 
in several acts) where the treaty is translated into Norwegian and rewritten to be more 
suitable for Norwegian conditions.  
  
In 1995, section 3 of the Introductory Provisions to the Customs Tariffs was edited to im-
plement the newly ratified GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement with its covered agree-
ments. The implementation was effected through both transformation and incorporation. As 
opposed to today’s provisions, section 3 covered both dumping and subsidies, and did not 
contain a definition of what constituted a subsidy. Section 3.3 stated that CVM could be 
used within the WTO framework if so decided by the King,48 and thereafter listed some 
rules that applied to both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures. In the 2007 Customs 
Act the provisions regarding subsidies and dumping have been seperated. 
 
Norway becoming part of the EEA in 1994 did not affect the Norwegian rules on subsidies 
and CVM in regard to countries outside the EEA. The EEA is not a customs union, and 
consequently the EFTA49 countries do not have common rules with the EU regarding trade 
with third party countries. The EEA only concerns trade with the other countries within the 
EEA. In consequence, the provisions in the EEA Agreement Article 26 and its Protocol 13 
regarding, inter alia, CVM, fall outside the scope of this thesis and will not be discussed 
any further.      
 
                                                
 
47 There is also a third type, so-called passive transformation, where the internal law is 
already in accordance with the international agreement, and this is simply stated. 
48 The King in Norwegian law is usually equivalent to the King in the Council of the State 
(the Government). 
49 European Free Trade Association. 
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There was an extensive amount of administrative decisions connected to the Customs Act 
of 1966, and this was one of the reasons for the revision in 2007. When the Ministry of 
Finance prepared the law, they said that lifting provisions that created rights for private 
people or companies from administrative regulations to formal acts was important for it to 
be in accordance with the principle of legal authority. The legislators wanted to make the 
law more accessible, but at the same time acknowledged that it would not be possible to 
make the law so that everybody could determine their legal rights only by consulting the 
act.50  
 
The Customs Act of 2007 uses both incorporation and transformation when implementing 
the WTO law. It also lifts the provisions regarding CVM from an administrative decision to 
a formal Act. The 2007 Act has three provisions implementing the WTO law regarding 
CVM,51 sections 10-3, 10-4 and 12-7. This is more than the previous legislation, but it still 
seems that many of Norway´s international obligations in this matter have been implement-
ed through what has been called sector-monism.52 According to section 10-3 paragraph 1, 
the introduction of CVM must happen within the limitations of international law and 
agreements with other states or organisations. As a consequence, international agreements 
will affect the application of the Act. This includes not only the relevant WTO law, but also 
bilateral free trade agreements and other treaties and agreements regarding subsidies and 
CVM. It also means that international obligations that did not exist when the Customs Act 
entered into force can be of significance. This is why it has been referred to as sector-
monism. This might be the most practical solution, but it makes it harder to determine ones 
rights and obligations according to the law.  
 
                                                
 
50 Ot.prp.nr. 58 (2006-2007) page 12. 
51 And any other international agreement that may be relevant.  
52 Ot.prp.nr. 58 (2006-2007) page 23 (”del-monisme”). 
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After years of revisions and development of international agreements that affect the Nor-
wegian framework for the use of CVM, Norway has ended up with a fragmented legislation 
that is not possible to understand by only reading the Customs Act.  
 
4.1.2 The Norwegian Framework Today  
The starting point when establishing the Norwegian framework for the use of CVM is the 
Customs Act of 2007. As the provisions covering this part of the law are few and not very 
detailed, I will also be using other legal sources to interpret the Act. 
 
In connection with the consultative round when preparing the Act, the Ministry of Finance 
prepared a discussion document. Out of consideration for the democracy, we should not 
attach great significance to these types of preparatory works, but on the other hand it is 
normally at this stage of the legislative process the groundwork for the act is prepared, and 
where we find most discussions and comments regarding its contents. Though we are not 
strictly bound by the preparatory works when interpreting an act, they are often referred to 
in jurisprudence if they are considered a relevant argument. Many factors, such as who 
produced the preparatory works,53 at what stage in the legislative process they were pre-
pared, their age, the type of statement etc. will affect the significance given to the prepara-
tory works. Their authority also depends on which other grounds we have for the interpre-
tation. If the text of an act is ambiguous, most people will comply with the preparatory 
works, given that the interpretation therein appears equally reasonable as the other possible 
interpretations. Nevertheless, if the preparatory works imply an interpretation that is in con-
flict with the ordinary meaning of the terms, the wording of the act will usually prevail.54  
 
                                                
 
53 A group of experts, a politician making a comment during the voting etc. 
54 Eckhoff (2001) page 73. 
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In addition to the discussion document, there is a proposition to the Odelsting,55 which 
forms part of the preparatory works to the Customs Act. This document originates from the 
democratically chosen government and should be considered more authoritative than the 
discussion document. What is unusual in the preparatory works to the Customs Act is that 
they seem to provide rights and obligations for the user of the Act that are not stipulated in 
the Act itself. The legislator has sought to legislate through the preparatory works. This is 
an ineffective legislative technique as it makes it hard to determine ones rights when read-
ing the Act. 
 
There are two administrative regulations that mention countervailing duties. The first is a 
parliamentary decision56 regarding customs duties for the budget year of 2013, which in 
section 5 merely states that it is up to the Government to decide whether or not to use sec-
tions 10-1 to 10-7 of the Customs Act 2007. The second is the so-called Customs Regula-
tion,57 but the section regarding CVM58 only makes a reference to an administrative regula-
tion regarding agricultural products, which is not of relevance to this thesis. As there is 
neither any jurisprudence from Norwegian courts regarding subsidies and CVM, nor any 
practice from the government, we are left with the Act, its preparatory works, international 
agreements and jurisprudence, and equitable considerations when determining the contents 
of the Norwegian framework.   
 
4.1.2.1 Norway´s Bilateral Agreements  
The international agreements that are part of the Norwegian framework is not limited to the 
relevant WTO law, but also includes free trade agreements Norway have signed with other 
                                                
 
55 Ot.prp.nr. 58 (2006-2007). 
56 Administrative Regulation of 27 November 2012 number 1218.  
57 Tollforskriften. 
58 Section 10 of the Customs Regulation. 
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countries.59 Norway´s free trade agreements have primarily been negotiated through EF-
TA60 with individual countries outside the EEA. The free trade agreements are an instru-
ment to reduce trade barriers and improve Norwegian export of goods and services.61 Per 9 
January 2013 Norway is a partner to 2462 free trade agreements and are negotiating with 
another 10 trade partners.  
 
The Norwegian framework would become too extensive if the WTO agreements and all the 
free trade agreements were implemented into the Customs Act, and it would make it even 
harder to determine ones rights according to the rules. However, as the WTO agreements 
are Norway´s main priority in its trade policies,63 having a more detailed implementation of 
the WTO framework with a reference to Norway´s free trade agreements could be a possi-
bility. Though the free trade agreements are part of the Norwegian framework for the use 
of CVM, I will not discuss the details of them any further.  
 
4.1.3 The EU Framework 
When discussing the Norwegian legislation, I will be using the EU framework for the use 
of CVM as a basis for comparison. The EU has used transformation to implement the SCM 
Agreement into Community legislation, and the result is very different from the Norwegian 
framework. I will analyse the differences and the impact they may have on the use of 
CVM.  
 
                                                
 
59 Ot.prp.nr. 58 (2006-2007) page 87. 
60 We also have one bilateral agreement, which is with the Faroe Islands. It was not 
negotiated through EFTA. 
61 Ministry of Trade and Industry, ”Om handelsavtaler” (2009). 
62 The one with Colombia has not yet been ratified. 
63 ”Om handelsavtaler” (2009). 
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The EU has implemented the SCM Agreement through Council Regulation (EC) No 
597/2009 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the Eu-
ropean Community. The significance of the rules being enacted through a regulation,64 is 
that it has general application and is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all 
Member States.65 Considering the EU represents its Members in trade disputes with other 
non-EU Members, it is more convenient that they all have the exact same rules. By making 
such a detailed legal framework in the Community legislation language, the EU has, as 
opposed to Norway, laid the groundwork for easier access to the rules for those who are 
given rights according to them, namely the industry. They do not have to confer with na-
tional legislation, preparatory works and international law to determine their rights. They 
have one regulation where all the relevant rules are collected (with the exception of bilat-
eral free trade agreements). 
 
The EC Regulation has 35 articles compared to the Norwegian legislation´s three sections. 
According to the preparatory works to the Norwegian Act, the reference to “international 
law” in section 10-3, creating a kind of sector-monism, shows loyalty to the other WTO 
Members.66 However, it seems more loyal to make sure that if the WTO provisions are 
implemented into domestic law, they are made clear and available.  
 
4.2 What Rights are granted the Solar Industry According to the Norwegian 
Framework and the EU Framework? 
In this section I will be analysing the Norwegian framework for the use of CVM and the 
corresponding rights in EC Regulation. I will be discussing the specific implementation of 
some of the WTO provisions regarding subsidies and CVM, and what rights the Norwegian 
legislation and the EC Regulation gives the private industry, and what rights the govern-
                                                
 
64 Rather than a directive or a recommendation. 
65 TFEU Article 288 paragraph 2. 
66 Ot.prp.nr. 58 (2006-2007) page 23. 
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ment has. I will also be discussing how the different legislative techniques may affect the 
use of these rights.  
 
4.2.1 The Rights Given to the Domestic Industries 
4.2.1.1 The Submission of an Application 
The SCM Agreement Article 11.1 stipulates that an anti-subsidy investigation “shall be 
initiated upon a written application by or on behalf of the domestic industry.” For the Nor-
wegian industry to have this right, the Government must grant them it. The Customs Act 
does not specifically mention who has the right to submit complaints or to whom the com-
plaint should be made. Section 12-7(1) states that “complaints against subsidised imports 
shall be directed to the Ministry”.67 The preparatory works state that Section 12-7 is meant 
to implement, inter alia, Article 11 of the SCM Agreement.68 Article 11.1 says that a com-
plaint must be made “by or on behalf of the domestic industry”, and therefore this must be 
the case according to the Norwegian Customs Act, too. There are no other factors that indi-
cate otherwise. 
  
The Ministry of Finance is granted authority according to the Customs Act, so when sec-
tion 12-7(1) says that “complaints against subsidised imports shall be directed to the Minis-
try”, it means the Ministry of Finance.  
 
                                                
 
67 ”Klage over subsidiert import skal rettes til departementet…” 
68 Ot.prp.nr. 58 (2006-2007) page 97. It seems that the preparatory works are referring to 
the wrong WTO covered agreement. It refers to, inter alia ”article 5 (initiation and 
subsequent investigation)”, which is found in the Anti-dumping Agreement. I assume that 
they mean the corresponding articles in the SCM Agreement and have therefore referred to 
Article 11 of the SCM Agreement.  
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Article 10.1 of the EC Regulation stipulates that “any natural or legal person, or any asso-
ciation not having legal personality, acting on behalf of the Community industry” can sub-
mit a written complaint to the Commission requesting anti-subsidy investigations. Accord-
ing to Article 10.11 of the EC Regulation, the Commission is obliged to initiate proceed-
ings within 45 days of the lodging of the complaint if “after consultations, it is apparent 
that there is sufficient evidence to justify initiating proceedings.” Neither the Norwegian 
legislation nor the SCM Agreement contains a similar timeframe for the authorities to de-
termine whether or not there is sufficient evidence, nor do they state an obligation to initi-
ate investigations given there is sufficient evidence. The Norwegian authorities may give 
other reasons for a rejection, such as the interests discussed in section 3.3.  
 
4.2.1.2 What Evidence Is Required In the Application? 
When a domestic industry submits an application with the authorities requesting an anti-
subsidy investigation, the application must include evidence that supports the initiation of 
an investigation. But what kind of evidence is required from the industry? 
 
The Customs Act section 12-7(1) says that the complaint shall be accompanied by “neces-
sary evidence”,69 but does not explain further what the evidence should be for. The old 
Norwegian framework70 is of no guidance as it contained no rule regarding evidence, but 
simply stated that the imposition of CVM had to be done within the WTO framework. The 
preparatory works stipulate that section 12-7 is meant to implement, inter alia, Article 11 of 
the SCM Agreement.71 Article 11.2 says that an application must include “sufficient evi-
dence of the existence of (a) a subsidy and, if possible, its amount, (b) injury within the 
meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement, and (c) a causal 
link between the subsidized imports and the alleged injury.” Though the Norwegian provi-
                                                
 
69 ”nødvendig bevismateriale”. 
70 Introductory Provisions to the Customs Tariffs § 3.3.  
71 Ot.prp.nr. 58 (2006-2007) page 97, see footnote 67. 
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sion requires “necessary evidence” whilst the SCM Agreement requires “sufficient evi-
dence”, there does not seem to be any reason to believe the Norwegian legislators have 
meant to demand any more or less evidence from the Norwegian industry than that needed 
according to the SCM Agreement. Consequently, “necessary evidence” in the Customs Act 
section 12-7(1) means the same as “sufficient evidence” in the SCM Agreement Article 
11.2.72  
 
The EC Regulation Article 10.2 contains rules regarding the evidence that must be provid-
ed in the complaint from the industry. Similar to the SCM Agreement, the EC Regulation 
requires “sufficient evidence of the existence of countervailable subsidies (including, if 
possible, of their amount), injury and a causal link between the allegedly subsidised im-
ports and the alleged injury.” Article 10.2(a)-(d) also contains requirements for additional 
information if it is “reasonably available” to the complainant. This is yet another example 
of how the EU has given more detailed regulations in their Regulation than that in the Cus-
toms Act, and thereby made it less complicated for the industries in the EU to determine 
what is required by them if they wish to make a complaint to the authorities.  
 
4.2.1.3 When Can the Authorities Initiate an Investigation? 
After the industry has submitted a complaint with the authorities, it is up to the authorities 
to initiate, or not initiate, an anti-subsidy investigation. In this section I will investigate 
under what circumstances the authorities can initiate an investigation. 
 
The SCM Agreement Article 11.3 requires that the authorities review the evidence provid-
ed in the complaint before initiating an investigation. This provision has been implemented 
into the Norwegian legislation through section 12-7(1) of the Customs Act, where it is stat-
ed: “A decision to impose a countervailing measure or provisional measure shall only be 
taken after a prior formal investigation.” According to the preparatory works, “formal in-
                                                
 
72 See section 2.4. 
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vestigation” means that the investigating authority must determine that the evidence it has 
been given is accurate and adequate, and that the complaint is made by, and has the neces-
sary support, from those with a right to make a complaint, before an investigation can be 
initiated.73 The Norwegian provision and its preparatory works fail to provide further de-
tails, and we must confer with the SCM Agreement Article 11.4 to determine what consti-
tutes “by or on behalf of the domestic industry”.74 Article 11.4 stipulates that the complaint, 
as a rule, must be supported by at least 50 per cent of “the domestic industry expressing 
either support for or opposition to the application”. Additionally, no less than 25 per cent of 
the “domestic industry” of the like product must expressly support the application.75 
 
The EC Regulation Articles 10.3 and 10.6 stipulate the same requirements as the SCM 
Agreement Articles 11.3 and 11.4 for the Commission to be able to initiate an anti-subsidy 
investigation. The wording is almost identical to the SCM Agreement, only with small 
modifications, presumably to make it more suitable for an EC Regulation. 
 
4.2.1.4 The Investigation and Imposition of CVM   
Section 10-3(1) of the Norwegian Customs Act requires the investigating authorities to 
determine “that there exists direct or indirect subsidisation of goods that are exported to 
Norway, and that the subsidisation causes or threatens to cause significant injury” before 
CVM can be imposed. These are the same requirements as stipulated by the SCM Agree-
ment Articles 17.1 and 19.1. In Norway, it is ultimately up to the Government to decide if 
the requirements are fulfilled and whether or not to impose CVM. Section 10-3(1) of the 
Customs Act stipulates: “…the King may … implement a countervailing measure.” (My 
underlining). This means that even though the domestic industry has submitted a valid 
complaint, the Ministry has investigated and concluded that there is evidence for a subsidy, 
                                                
 
73 Ot.prp.nr. 58 (2006-2007), page 97. 
74 See section 4.2.1.1. 
75 See section 2.4. 
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injury to the domestic industry and a link between the two, and sent a proposition to the 
Government, the Government is not bound by the proposition. Other factors, such as those 
I discussed in section 3.3, may influence the decision of whether or not to impose counter-
vailing duties. If, for example, REC had submitted a complaint with the Ministry and the 
Ministry had investigated and proposed to the Government that they impose CVM upon 
imports of Chinese solar panels, the Government could reject this on the grounds of the 
tense relationship between the two countries, and not wanting to put further pressure on the 
relationship. The decision is left to the discretion of the Government. The SCM Agreement 
does not obligate Members to use CVM; it just stipulates the rules that must be followed if 
a Member wishes to do so.  
 
The EU also require a final determination of the existence of a specific subsidy to export-
ers, injury to the Community industry and a causal link between the two, before the Coun-
cil can impose CVM. But the EU has gone further, and as the only WTO Member they ad-
ditionally require a determination as to whether or not the use of CVM will be against the 
Community interests.76 This is to ensure that the overall economic interests of the EU do 
not suffer as a result of the use of CVM.77 According to Article 31.1, the community inter-
est includes “the interests of the domestic industry and users and consumers.” An imposi-
tion of definitive CVM will mean that those importing the products concerned, the Com-
munity industries using the products and, ultimately the consumers, will have to pay a 
higher price. As this is an argument that could be used to argue against most cases of im-
posing CVM, Article 31.1 also says that special consideration shall be given to “the need to 
eliminate the trade-distorting effects of injurious subsidisation and to restore effective 
competition.” The authorities must therefore “clearly conclude that it is not in the Commu-
nity interest to apply such measures.”78 
                                                
 
76 EC Regulation No 597/2009 Article 15.1. 
77 EC Regulation No 597/2009 Article 31. 
78 EC Regulation 597/2009 Article 31.1. 
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Compared to Norway, where it seems the authorities can base a decision not to use CVM 
on any interest they find relevant, the authorities in the EU must show that it is clearly not 
in the interest of the European Community to impose CVM. This gives the industry a 
stronger right than according to Norwegian law, given that there is sufficient evidence for a 
subsidy causing injury to the domestic industry.  
 
4.2.1.5 Timeframes For the Investigation 
The strict timeframes for the investigations provided for in the SCM Agreement Article 
11.11 have been explicitly implemented in the Norwegian Customs Act section 12-7(2). 
Investigations should be concluded within one year, and in no case later than 18 months 
after their initiation. The EC Regulation has made the timeframes even stricter, and investi-
gations must in any event be concluded within 13 months.79 For the industry it will be ben-
eficial that the investigation is concluded as soon as possible. They are most likely losing 
income every day the subsidised imports are freely accepted into the domestic market. On 
the other hand, it is important that the result of an investigation is correct. If a Member 
wrongfully imposes CVM upon the imports from another Member, it can be challenged in 
the WTO dispute settlement system.80  
 
4.2.2 Does the Method of Implementation Affect the use of Countervailing 
Measures? 
Trade measures, including CVM, have not been used in Norway since the 1980´s,81 and it 
can be asked if this is a result of the limited rights pronounced explicitly in the Customs 
                                                
 
79 EC Regulation 597/2009 Article 11.9. 
80 The SCM Agreement Articles 30 and 32.1.  
81 Discussion document page 93. States that trade measures have not been used by Norway 
since the 1980´s, but failes to mention what kind of measures that was used. 
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Act. The fact that the international law on CVM is not implemented through a more de-
tailed transformation in Norway may be seen as a signal that the Government has little am-
bition to use CVM as a method to protect Norwegian industry from artificial foreign com-
petition. This is not saying that the Government does not wish to protect Norwegian indus-
try, but that they do not consider CVM as the best way to do it. The WTO covered agree-
ments do not require countries to use CVM, but if a WTO Member wishes to do so, it must 
be done in accordance with the rules prescribed therein. 
 
Though it is ultimately the Government who decides whether or not to impose CVM in 
Norway, they are, as a rule, dependent on the domestic industry´s complaint before they 
can initiate anti-subsidy investigations. If the law is not clear, the industry might not even 
know of their right to complain. Clearer rights pronounced in the legal framework will 
make the industry better aware of their rights and, potentially, result in them using their 
rights. However, if Norway´s policy is to not use CVM, the industry itself cannot force the 
imposition of such measures as long as they are only given a right to complain, and not a 
right for the complaint to lead to an investigation, and possibly the imposition of CVM, 
provided certain conditions are fulfilled. If REC had made a complaint, the decision would 
still lie with the Government, and for them, interests like the ones mentioned in section 3.3 
will affect the decision. For example, if the consequences on the public economy and the 
evaluations of corporate-, foreign- and trade policies are not in favour of using CVM, they 
will most likely not be imposed.    
 
The table below shows where some of the rights granted in the WTO law have been im-








 WTO NORWAY THE EU 
The industry´s 
right to complain 
The SCM Agree-
ment Article 11.1 
Ot.prp.nr. 58 (2006-
2007) page 87 
EC Regulation Arti-
cle 10.1 
Application “by or 
on behalf of the 
industry” 
The SCM Agree-
ment Articles 11.1, 
11.4 and 16 
Ot.prp.nr. 58 (2006-
2007) page 87, ref-
erence to the SCM 
Agreement Art. 11  
EC Regulation Arti-
cles 10.6 and 9 
The government´s 
right to complain 
The SCM Agree-
ment Article 11.6 
Ot.prp.nr. 58 (2006-
2007) page 97 
EC Regulation Arti-




ment Article 11.11 







ment Article 13 
Ref.: “international 
law” in Customs Act 
section 10-3(1) 
EC Regulation Arti-
cles 10.7 and 11.10 
 
As the table demonstrates, very few of the Articles from the WTO law on subsidies and 
CVM have found their way into the Customs Act. Many provisions must be interpreted into 
the law through reference to international law or by comments in the preparatory works. 
This makes the legislation less accessible for the private industry, and knowledge of inter-
national law becomes necessary to fully understand the Norwegian law.  
 
The EU has chosen a method where even the details of the WTO framework are trans-
formed into an EC regulation. The wording has been slightly changed to correspond to 
Community legislation, and in some places the Regulation has provided additional re-
quirements or stricter timeframes, but still within the WTO framework. This method makes 
the provisions more accessible, and makes it easier for the domestic industries to determine 
their rights. This can be demonstrated by looking at how often CVM have been used. The 
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last time it was used in Norway was in the 1980´s,82 whilst the EU occasionally uses it. 
However, Norway and the EU have different starting points when determining whether or 
not to use CVM. The effect for the EU when using such duties is a lot more significant than 
if used by a small country like Norway. The EU consists of 27 countries that will all im-
pose them simultaneously.  
 
The different legislations may also signalise that the industry has a strong position in the 
EU, whilst in Norway the government has a more dominant position. 
 
4.2.3 EU Use of Countervailing Measures 
4.2.3.1 EU vs China – The Case of Solar Power on the Continent  
The EU has a clear mandate to fight unfair trade by using, inter alia, the instruments pro-
vided for by the WTO,83 and they are increasingly using CVM to protect their industries. 
On 8 April 2013, there were five anti-subsidy investigations in process in the EU.84 8 No-
vember 2012, the European Commission gave notice of initiation of an anti-subsidy pro-
ceeding concerning imports of solar panels and their key components from China.85 If REC 
was still producing in Norway, the outcome of this investigation could have had huge re-
percussions on their production in Norway. Nonetheless, it will have consequences for the 
remaining solar industry in Norway as they export a lot of their production to the EU mar-
                                                
 
82 Discussion document, page 93. 
83 EU Trade Commissioner, Karel De Gucht, December 2012: "The EU's membership in 
the World Trade Organisation and bilateral trade agreements help the EU economy. Those 
agreements must be respected for them to deliver results. When international trade disputes 
prove that other countries haven't played by the rules, the EU needs to be able to react 
efficiently and swiftly to defend its interests". 
84 List of Investigations from the European Commission on Trade. 
85 ”EU initiates anti-subsidy investigation on solar panel imports from China” (2012).  
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ket. Norway therefore must be said to have so-called third party interests in the EU vs Chi-
na case. Does Norway have any rights in the EU investigation against China or if a dispute 
arises for the WTO dispute settlement system?  
 
4.2.4 Third Party Interests 
4.2.4.1 Third Party Interests In an Investigation 
If more than one Member has an interest in initiating anti-subsidy investigations against 
another Member, it should be asked if these Members could cooperate in their investiga-
tions by sharing information and findings. There are no rules regarding Members cooperat-
ing in an anti-subsidy investigation in the SCM Agreement, but Article 12.1 contain rules 
concerning the collection of evidence in an investigation, which stipulates that “Interested 
Members and all interested parties in a countervailing measure investigation” shall be giv-
en an opportunity to present evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the inves-
tigation. In the example with the EU and China, this means that the EU can request evi-
dence from other Members, e.g. the US, who have already concluded their investigations 
against China. However, the EU must conduct their own investigation, as, according to the 
SCM Agreement Article 11.7, the investigating authorities must consider the “evidence of 
both subsidy and injury” simultaneously. This means that even though another Member has 
imposed CVM upon imports from China, the EU may not necessarily be able to do the 
same. It is the injury to the Community industry that is relevant, and the Commission must 
determine if the subsidy still exists.  
 
Article 12.1 also creates a right for Norway, as an “interested Member” in the EU investi-
gation against China´s solar industry, to be given the opportunity to present evidence they 
may have. It should be asked if REC, as a competitor on the EU market, could contribute 
with evidence in the EU investigation. It seems clear that subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of Arti-
cle 12.9 would not include REC as and “interested party”, but they could be allowed to 
provide evidence according to the provision in the second sentence of Article 12.9, which 
includes others than those specifically mentioned in the first sentence.     
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4.2.4.2 Third Party Interests In a WTO Dispute  
If a dispute regarding the imposition of CVM arises for a WTO panel, Members who are 
not a party to the dispute may be heard in the proceedings if they have a substantial interest 
in the matter and have notified the DSB.86 For example, Norway has joined one of the dis-
putes between China and the US regarding CVM imposed by the US on, inter alia, solar 
panel components from China.87 Even though REC no longer produces in Norway, it is still 
a Norwegian company, which is important for Norway, and we have other solar panel 
companies in Norway. As the US is one of the worlds most developed solar markets,88 it 
can affect the Norwegian solar industry if they are importing subsidised solar panels. Con-
sequently, the dispute between the US and China is of “substantial interest” to Norway, and 
they have notified the DSB of their interests. The dispute has not yet been concluded.  
 
4.3 The State´s Right to Use Countervailing Measures  
In this section I will be discussing the rights of the authorities to use CVM without a prior 
complaint from the industry.  
 
The general rule regarding the initiation of anti-subsidy investigations is that the WTO 
Member State must receive an application from the domestic industry.89 But if the Norwe-
gian government had wanted to investigate possible subsidised imports of solar panels and 
subsequent injury caused to the Norwegian solar industry, could they have done that with-
out a complaint from, e.g. REC?  
 
                                                
 
86 DSU Article 10.2.  
87 US — Countervailing Measures (China). 
88 Market Overview by REC.   
89 The SCM Agreement Article 11.1. 
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There is an exception to the general rule in Article 11.6 of the SCM Agreement. According 
to this provision, the “authorities concerned” can initiate investigations without a written 
application from the domestic industry, if they have “sufficient evidence of a subsidy, inju-
ry and a causal link, as described in paragraph 2…” Additionally, there must be “special 
circumstances”.  
 
This rule illustrates how the WTO regulates and limits a purely national process, and they 
tend to react strictly to breaches of the agreements. If the rules regarding e.g. initiation of 
an investigation, the investigation itself, or the imposition of CVM, are not followed, the 
Member affected by the measure may challenge the CVM through the WTO dispute set-
tlement system. Therefore, it is important to determine what constitutes, or does not consti-
tute, “special circumstances”, which I will discuss in the following section. I will also dis-
cuss any special circumstances that may have been present in the REC case.   
      
4.3.1 “Special Circumstances” 
The basis to determine what may constitute “special circumstances” is the VCLT´s rules of 
interpretation. Article 31.1 says that the general rule of interpretation is that “A treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their contexts and in the light of its object and purpose”. The Oxford 
Dictionary defines “special” as something that is “particularly good; exceptional; out of the 
ordinary.” However, this gives little guidance for the interpretation unless we put it in the 
context of the SCM Agreement, specifically the provisions regarding initiation of an anti-
subsidy investigation.  
 
Paragraph 6 of Article 11 is an exception to the main rule in paragraph 1, which says that 
the domestic industry must submit an application with the authorities before they can initi-
ate an investigation. The typical reason for the domestic industry to submit an application 
will be that they are experiencing unfair competition from foreign producers who are re-
ceiving specific subsidies from their governments. The injury suffered by the domestic in-
dustry will typically be the loss of market shares. Being an exception, paragraph 6 should 
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require something else and more than that which follows from the main rule. Restricting 
the exception to “special circumstances” implies that it must be reasoned by something else 
than what would usually be the reason for a complaint made by the industry according to 
paragraph 1. Accordingly, the authorities cannot justify the initiation of an investigation 
just because an industry is losing market shares.  
 
There is no WTO jurisprudence discussing the SCM Agreement Article 11.6 and what con-
stitutes “special circumstances”. The Anti-Dumping Agreement Article 5.6 contains a simi-
lar provision, but like the SCM Agreement´s provision, it has not been topic for discussion 
in a dispute in the WTO dispute settlement system.   
 
4.3.1.1 Special Circumstances in the REC Case 
The next question that should be asked is if there were “special circumstances” in the REC 
case that could have supported the Norwegian government if they had wanted to initiate 
investigations into China´s solar industry to prevent REC from closing down its production 
in Norway. 
 
As I wrote in section 3.3.1, the Norwegian government has provided supported for the solar 
industry´s development, for example by investing in research and supporting companies, 
e.g. REC, starting up production in Norway. When REC moved their production abroad, 
Norway not only lost an industry, but also an investment. However, investments are made 
every day, and there is no guarantee that an investment will be beneficial. The investments 
made by the Norwegian government were not completely wasted as REC is still producing 
and developing the industry. They have not suffered bankruptcy and shut down all research 
and production, so in the bigger picture the investment has paid off, even though it may not 
have been as beneficial for Norway as hoped.  
 
Another factor in the REC case was the loss of jobs. When REC closed down their produc-
tion facilities in Norway, hundreds of people lost their jobs. The factories were located in 
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fairly small communities90 where REC became cornerstone companies, and the effects on 
the communities could be severe, depending on the options for those left unemployed.  
 
When REC stopped producing in Norway, they took their technology abroad. Technology 
that had been supported through research in Norway, possibly even financed by the gov-
ernment. Given that REC did not hold a patent on the technology, it would still be available 
for other companies to use, but Norway lost the largest company that used the technology 
and thereby limited the opportunity to develop it further domestically. Any technology that 
REC had taken out a patent on was lost for Norway. Consequently, Norway did not only 
lose an industry, their investments, and jobs, but also advanced technology that could bene-
fit both Norway and the global environment in the future. It seems possible that when the 
government itself has been so involved in developing technology for an industry, it could 
justify them initiating anti-subsidy investigations to protect their investment and interest in 
the industry, even without a complaint from the industry itself. 
 
Norway also had to consider its third party interests in the environment in the REC case. In 
section 3.3.5, I mentioned the Norwegian climate policy and the political ambition to de-
velop technologies to mitigate climate change as relevant environmental interests. In order 
for it to be profitable for the government to invest resources to develop solar technologies, 
we need an industry that can utilise the technologies. The government needs an industry to 
fulfil its goals. Furthermore, Norway has international obligations to maintain, e.g. the 
UNFCCC Article 4.5, which contains an obligation for developed countries to transfer cer-
                                                
 
90 Glomfjord had 1,264 inhabitants per 01.01.2012: 
http://www.meloy.kommune.no/no/Om-Meloy/Fakta-om-Meloy/Folketall/  





tain technologies to developing countries. Before a country can transfer technology, it must 
develop the technology, and it is unlikely that a country will develop a technology only to 
transfer it to other countries. However, if they have their own industry using the technolo-
gy, they will have an (extra) incentive to develop it. Accordingly, the development and 
maintenance of a solar industry in Norway can benefit developing countries that Norway 
may transfer its technologies to. If the use of CVM was decisive for the survival and devel-
opment of the Norwegian solar industry, and thereby the transfer of technology, it could 
speak in favour of using such duties. I refer to my analysis of the UNFCCC Article 4.5 in 
section 3.3.5.1 for a detailed discussion of this problem.  
 
Finally, there is the factor of supporting a sustainable future by having an industry that de-
velops and produces environmentally friendly technology. If the alternative to imposing 
CVM in the REC case was Norway having to use, for example, coal to produce electricity, 
this could have spoken in favour of allowing the authorities themselves to initiate anti-
subsidy investigations. Protecting the environment and securing a sustainable future will 
benefit the whole world, and WTO panels and the Appellate Body have occasionally used 
environmental interests to support a decision.91 Though we cannot know if environmental 
interests in general will be accepted by the Appellate Body, reports show that they at least 
consider the environment where it is relevant for a case. I do however consider it more like-
ly that the Appellate Body would accept a more specific interest, e.g. the preservation of an 
endangered species.92  
                                                
 
91 Example: United States — Shrimp. The dispute did not concern CVM and ”special 
circumstances” according to the SCM Agreement Article 11.6. It related to turtle protection 
standards when harvesting shrimp that was imported into the US. The Appellate Body 
made clear that countries have the right to take trade action to protect the environmnet and 
endangered species and exhaustible resources. The US lost the case, not because it sought 




It is uncertain how much is needed before there can be said to exists “special circumstanc-
es”. The separate factors I have discussed in this section will most probably not be suffi-
cient alone, but combined they might be enough. The more “special” the circumstances are, 
as in the further away from what is ordinarily the reason for a complaint, the more probable 
it is that it will be accepted as “special circumstances” according to the SCM Agreement 
Article 11.6.  
 
4.3.2 “Special Circumstances” According to EU Law 
The EU has adapted the implementation of the WTO rules to fit its organisation. An exam-
ple of this is the exception to the general rule for initiation of an investigation needing an 
application on behalf of the Community industry.93 Article 10.1(3) of the EC Regulation 
stipulates that its Member States shall give evidence it may have of “subsidisation and of 
resultant injury to the Community industry” to the Commission, regardless of receiving a 
prior application. This rule seems to be based on the organisation of the EU, which puts the 
Commission in charge of CVM investigations. To avoid the domestic authorities in the EU 
Member States having no rights unless the industry complains, they are given the oppor-
tunity to give the Commission evidence it may be in possession of. However, it is the 
Commission that is given the right to initiate anti-subsidy investigations without a prior 
application on behalf of the Community industry. Article 10.8 of the Regulation stipulates 
that the Commission in such cases must have “sufficient evidence of the existence of coun-
tervailable subsidies, injury and causal link”. “Special circumstances” must also be present, 
which is the same requirements as in the SCM Agreement Article 11.6 and in the Norwe-
gian law. 
 
                                                
 
93 Council Regulation (EC) No. 597/2009 Article 10.1(1). 
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After reviewing the anti-subsidy investigations available, on the European Commission on 
Trade´s website, there does not seem to be any investigations that have been initiated by 
the Commission without a prior application from the Community industry.94  
 
4.3.3 Conclusion 
Though there are many factors that may constitute “special circumstances”, neither the EU 
nor Norway has, as far as I can see, initiated anti-subsidy investigations without a prior 
complaint from the industry, nor is there any WTO jurisprudence regarding this. The rea-
sons why it has not been used are unknown, but it may be it is not considered necessary to 
initiate anti-subsidy investigations unless the industry itself has complained. It seems likely 
that the industry, if familiar with their rights, will complain if they are being injured by 
artificial competition from abroad. Further, it will not be as practical for a small country 
like Norway as it may be for the EU or larger countries to use this exception. For them the 
effects of using CVM will be larger than for Norway. 
                                                
 
94 The investigations prior to 2003 are not available in the search engine, and of the 29 
investigations that have taken place since 2003, not all initiation notifications have been 
made available online. My statement is based on the available information.  
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5 Summary and Conclusion 
I have discussed the framework for CVM at two levels; first the rules as they were agreed 
upon in the WTO through the Uruguay Round, and second the implementation of these 
rules into domestic legislation, in Norway and in the EU. I have discussed different actors´ 
interests in the use of CVM, and I have demonstrated differences in the techniques of im-
plementation and how this and other factors may affect a country´s use of CVM. 
   
As WTO Members are not obliged to use CVM and have different starting points for using 
them, it is difficult to say that one method for implementation is more correct than the oth-
er. Nevertheless, the chosen method may reflect national policies on, and affect the use of, 
CVM. I have analysed two different approaches that can be used when implementing the 
WTO rules on subsidies and CVM and discussed some of the possible reasons behind the 
different use of these measures. The difference between Norway´s and the EU´s implemen-
tation may be reasoned in their different starting points and needs. Norway is a small coun-
try whilst the EU is one of the worlds largest custom unions. When the EU imposes CVM, 
they are imposed in all its 27 Member States, which naturally has a greater impact than if 
one country alone does so. CVMs are a more efficient means to promote free trade for the 
EU than for Norway, which is supported by the fact that the EU has initiated 29 anti-
subsidy investigations since 2003, whilst Norway has initiated zero.   
 
As there is no international obligation to use CVM to counteract certain types of subsidies, 
WTO Members are not obligated to implement the WTO rules on this matter into their na-
tional legislation. Many interests today may speak in favour of Norway not using CVM. In 
the solar industry, the fact that they receive considerable support (subsidies) from the Nor-
wegian government, may create a fear of being subject to investigations themselves, and 
thereby prevent the Norwegian industry and government from participating in the ongoing 
solar trade war. The other reasons discussed in section 3 may also affect the decision, and 
in the REC case, CVM was perhaps not considered an effective measure to protect the 
Norwegian solar industry, which was, and still is, largely export orientated and dependent 
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on the export market. However, what if a domestic industry with its main market in Nor-
way is injured by subsidised imports? What if the Norwegian bunad production faces injury 
from China? Or Finnish timber threatens the Norwegian timber industry? Even though 
CVM are not being used in Norway today, it might be deemed necessary in the future. If 
that happens, a clear framework stating the rights and obligations of the industry and the 
government should be in place. This does not necessarily mean that all the international 
rights and obligations should be implemented into the Customs Act, but it is hard to deter-
mine the content of today´s fragmented framework. The Ministry of Finance is given the 
authority to make administrative regulations with more detailed rules regarding the use of 
CVM.95 A common administrative regulation96 has been made to complement the Customs 
Act, but the section concerning trade measures97 has no provisions regarding CVM. The 
first step should be to move the rights that have been given through the preparatory works 
to the Customs Regulation. This would make it easier for those trying to determine their 
rights, and it would be more in line with the principle of legal authority.  
 
Though Norway is not currently using CVM, I have discussed other ways Norway can par-
ticipate in anti-subsidy investigations carried out in other countries or disputes brought for 
the WTO dispute settlement system. In section 3.3 I discussed Norway´s dependence on the 
rest of the world, and this speaks in favour of participating in issues that can affect Norway, 
either as a third party to disputes or by providing evidence in investigations carried out in 
other countries. Since the SCM Agreement entered into force in 1995, Norway has partici-
pated as a third party in three disputes regarding renewable energy.98 Norway has brought 
four cases for the WTO dispute settlement system regarding trade measures taken against 
                                                
 
95 Customs Act section 10-3(7). 
96 The Customs Regulation. 
97 Customs Regulation section 10. 
98 Canada – Feed-In Tariff Program, Canada – Renewable Energy and US – 
Countervailing Measures (China) 
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Norwegian exports, but none of these concerned the Norwegian solar industry, or other 
renewable energy industries.  
 
Though REC is no longer producing in Norway, they are still a Norwegian company, and 
the government should take an interest in it. In July 2012, REC was made a respondent to 
Chinese trade investigations into the US solar industry.99 If the Chinese government impos-
es CVM upon imports from the US, it will affect REC´s exports from their US based pro-
duction facilities to China. 
 
In addition to participating in investigations and disputes abroad, Norway should take a 
stand and decide whether or not they wish to use CVM. They do not have to implement the 
WTO rules if they have no intention of using them, but it is also important to remember 
that conditions may change rapidly, and we may want to use CVM in the future. In such a 
case it would be beneficial to have a clear framework for the use of CVM in place.   
 
 
                                                
 
99 Press release: “REC Regrets the Escalation In Solar Industry Trade War And Denies Any 
Wrongdoing” 
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